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Abstract
We ask the question whether entropy accumulates, in the sense that the opera-
tionally relevant total uncertainty about an n-partite system A = (A1, . . . An) cor-
responds to the sum of the entropies of its parts Ai. The Asymptotic Equipartition
Property implies that this is indeed the case to first order in n — under the assumption
that the parts Ai are identical and independent of each other. Here we show that en-
tropy accumulation occurs more generally, i.e., without an independence assumption,
provided one quantifies the uncertainty about the individual systems Ai by the von
Neumann entropy of suitably chosen conditional states. The analysis of a large system
can hence be reduced to the study of its parts. This is relevant for applications. In
device-independent cryptography, for instance, the approach yields essentially optimal
security bounds valid for general attacks, as shown by Arnon-Friedman et al. [5].
1 Introduction
In classical information theory, the uncertainty one has about a variable A given access to
side information B can be operationally quantified by the number of bits one would need to
learn in addition to B in order to reconstruct A. While this number generally fluctuates, it
is — except with probability of order ε > 0 — not larger than the ε-smooth max-entropy,
Hεmax(A|B)ρ, evaluated for the joint distribution ρ of A and B [44].1 Conversely, it is in the
same way not smaller than the ε-smooth min-entropy, Hεmin(A|B)ρ. This may be summarised
by saying that the number of bits needed to reconstruct A from B is with probability at
least 1−O(ε) contained in the interval
I =
[
Hεmin(A|B)ρ, Hεmax(A|B)ρ
]
, (1)
whose boundaries are defined by the smooth entropies.
This approach to quantifying uncertainty can be extended to the case where A and B are
quantum systems. The conclusion remains the same: the operationally relevant uncertainty
interval is I as defined by (1). The only difference is that ρ is now a density operator, which
describes the joint state of A and B [43, 40, 50].
Finding the boundaries of the interval I is a central task of information theory. However,
the smooth entropies of a large system A are often difficult to calculate. It is therefore rather
1There is some freedom in how to count the number of bits, but the statement always holds up to additive
terms of the order log(1/ε).
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Figure 1: Circuit diagram illustrating the decomposition of states ρAn1Bn1 relevant for our
main theorem. One starts with a state ρ0R0 , and each of the AiBi is generated sequentially,
one after the other, by the process Mi.
common to introduce certain assumptions to render this task more feasible. One extremely
popular approach in standard information theory is to assume that the system consists of
many mutually independent and identically distributed (IID) parts. More precisely, the
IID Assumption demands that the system be of the form A = An1 = A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ An, that
the side information have an analogous structure B = Bn1 = B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bn, and that the
joint state of these systems be of the form ρA1B1···AnBn = ν
⊗n
AB, for some density operator
νAB. A fundamental result from information theory, the Asymptotic Equipartition Property
(AEP) [47] (see [52] for the quantum version), then asserts that the uncertainty interval
satisfies
I ⊂
[
n
(
H(A|B)ν − cε√
n
)
, n
(
H(A|B)ν + cε√
n
)]
, (2)
where cε is a constant (independent of n) and where H(A|B)ν is the conditional von
Neumann entropy evaluated for the state νAB . In other words, for large n, the opera-
tionally relevant total uncertainty one has about An1 given B
n
1 is well approximated by
nH(A|B)ν =
∑
iH(Ai|Bi)ρ. In this sense, the entropy of the individual systems Ai accu-
mulates to the entropy of the total system An1 .
In this work, we generalise this statement to the case where the individual pairs Ai⊗Bi
are no longer independent of each other, i.e., where the IID assumption does not hold.
Suppose that we think of the pairs Ai ⊗ Bi as being generated sequentially by mappings
Mi, as in Figure 1. The state of each system Ai may then not only depend on the side
information Bi, but also on all “previous” systems A
i−1
1 as well as their side information
Bi−11 . The only assumption we make is that A
i
1 is independent of “future” side information
Bi+1 given the “past” side information B
i
1.
2 Entropy accumulation is then the claim that
I ⊂
[
n∑
i=1
(
inf
ωRi−1R
H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) −
cε√
n
)
,
n∑
i=1
(
sup
ωRi−1R
H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
cε√
n
)]
, (3)
where ωRi−1R is any joint state of Ri−1 and a system R isomorphic to the latter, and where
Mi(ω) abbreviates (Mi ⊗ IR)(ωRi−1R). Note that R may contain a copy of the “previous”
systems Ai−11 B
i−1
1 . In other words, at every step the lower (upper) boundary of I grows
by the smallest (largest) amount of von Neumann entropy that can be produced by the
process Mi.
The main result we derive in this work is slightly more general than (3), allowing one
to take into account global information about the statistics of An1 and B
n
1 . This is relevant
2More precisely, we need to ensure that for every i, Ai−1
1
↔ Bi−1
1
↔ Bi forms a quantum Markov chain.
This condition is necessary, as shown in Appendix C.
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Figure 2: Circuit diagram illustrating the decomposition of states ρAn1Bn1Xn1 where a statis-
tical test is included. Here, Xi can be determined from Ai and Bi.
for applications. In quantum key distribution, for instance, the process Mi corresponds to
generating the ith bit of the raw key. However, the properties of the individual maps Mi
are insufficient to bound the entropy (which characterises an adversary’s uncertainty) of the
generated bits, and one must as well take into account global statistical properties. These
are inferred by tests carried out by the quantum key distribution protocol on a small sample
of the generated bits. To incorporate such statistical information in the analysis, we consider
for each i an additional classical value Xi derived from Ai and Bi, as depicted by Figure 2.
Specifically, Xi shall tell us whether position i was included in the statistical test, and if
so, the outcome of the test performed at step i. For this extended scenario, (3) still holds,
but now the infimum and supremum are taken over a restricted set, containing only those
states ω for which the resulting probability distribution on Xi corresponds to the observed
statistics.
Entropy accumulation has a number of theoretical and practical implications. As shown
in [5], it can be used to establish security of device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion and randomness expansion against general attacks. The resulting security bounds are
essentially tight, implying that device-independent cryptography is possible with state-of-
the-art technology. To illustrate the basic ideas behind such applications, we will present
two concrete examples in more detail. The first is a proof of security of a variant of the E91
Quantum Key Distribution protocol. While this particular proof reproduces known security
bounds, its structure is modular and it may therefore be adapted to other cryptographic
schemes (see also the discussion in Section 6). The second example is the derivation of an
upper bound on the fidelity achievable by Fully Quantum Random Access Codes.
The proof of the main result, Eq. (3), has a similar structure as the proof of the Quan-
tum Asymptotic Equipartition Property [52], which we can retrieve as a special case (see
Corollary 4.9). The idea is to first bound the smooth entropy of the entire sequence An1
conditioned on Bn1 by a conditional Re´nyi entropy of order α, then decompose this entropy
into a sum of conditional Re´nyi entropies for the individual terms Ai, and finally bound
these in terms of von Neumann entropies. However, in contrast to previous arguments,
we use a recently introduced version of conditional Re´nyi entropies, termed “sandwiched
Re´nyi entropies” [58, 36]. For these entropies, we derive a novel chain rule, which forms
the core technical part of our proof. In addition, some of the concepts used in this work
generalise techniques proposed in the recent security proofs for device-independent cryp-
tography presented in [33, 34]. In particular, the dominant terms of the lower bound on
the amount of randomness obtained in [34], called rate curves, are similar to the tradeoff
3
functions considered here (cf. Definition 4.1).3
Paper organisation: We begin with preliminaries and notation in Section 2. Section 3
is devoted to the central technical ingredient of our argument, a chain rule for Re´nyi en-
tropies. The main result, the theorem on entropy accumulation, is then stated and proved
in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the two sample applications mentioned above, before
concluding with remarks and suggestions for future work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
In the table below, we summarise some of the notation used throughout the paper:
Symbol Definition
A,B,C, . . . Quantum systems, and their associated Hilbert spaces
L(A,B) Set of linear operators from A to B
L(A) L(A,A)
XAB Operator in L(A⊗B)
XB←A Operator in L(A,B)
D(A) Set of normalised density operators on A
D6(A) Set of sub-normalised density operators on A
Pos(A) Set of positive semidefinite operators on A
X−1 for X ∈ Pos(A) Generalised inverse, such that XX−1X = X holds
XA > YA XA − YA ∈ Pos(A)
Aji (with j > i) Given n systems A1, . . . , An, this is a shorthand for Ai, . . . , Aj
An Often used as shorthand for A1, . . . , An
log(x) Logarithm of x in base 2
Furthermore, we use the following notation for classical-quantum states ρXA ∈ D(X⊗A)
with respect to the basis {|x〉}x∈X of the system X . For any x ∈ X , we let ρA,x = 〈x|ρAX |x〉
so that ρXA =
∑
x∈X |x〉〈x|⊗ρA,x. To refer to the conditional state, we write ρA|x = ρA,xtr(ρA,x) .
An event Ω ⊆ X in this paper refers to a subset of X and we can similarly define ρXA|Ω =
1
ρ[Ω]
∑
x∈Ω |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρA,x, where we introduced the notation ρ[Ω] =
∑
x∈Ω tr(ρA,x). We also
use the usual notation for the partial trace for conditional states, e.g., ρXA|Ω = trB(ρXAB|Ω).
For a density operator ρAB ∈ D(A ⊗ B) on a bipartite Hilbert space A ⊗ B we define
the operator4
ρA|B = (idA ⊗ ρB)−
1
2 ρAB(idA ⊗ ρB)− 12 ,
which may be interpreted as the state of A conditioned on B, analogous to a conditional
probability distribution. This operator was previously defined and studied in [6, 29]. In
the following, we will usually drop identity operators from the notation when they are clear
from the context. We would thus write, for instance,
ρA|B = ρ
− 1
2
B ρABρ
− 1
2
B .
3While the tradeoff functions are defined in terms of conditional von Neumann entropies, the rate curves
are equal to a difference of (1 + ε)-Re´nyi entropies (see [34, Section 6]). The latter cannot be larger than
the tradeoff functions, which yield asymptotically optimal randomness extraction rates (as shown in [5]).
4Note that this operator is well defined, for the support of ρAB is contained in the support of idA ⊗ ρB .
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Remark 2.1. Let A and A¯ be two isomorphic Hilbert spaces with orthonormal bases {|i〉A}
and {|i〉A¯} and define
|Θ〉 =
∑
i
|i〉A ⊗ |i〉A¯ .
Then any trace-non-increasing map M = MB←A¯ from A¯ to B can be represented as a
“conditional state” MB|A on A⊗B with the property that
MB|A > 0 and trB[MB|A] 6 idA (4)
and such that
M(ρ
1
2
A|Θ〉〈Θ|ρ
1
2
A) = ρ
1
2
AMB|Aρ
1
2
A ∀ρA (5)
holds. Specifically, for any map M one may define
MB|A =M(|Θ〉〈Θ|) ; (6)
it is then straightforward to verify the properties above.
Conversely, for any MB|A such that (4) holds the map defined by
M(|i〉A¯〈j|A¯) = 〈i|AMB|A|j〉A
satisfies (6) and hence (5). It is also easy to verify that it is completely positive and trace
non-increasing.
2.2 Background on quantum Markov chains
The concept of quantum Markov chains will be used throughout the paper, and here we
give some relevant basic facts about them. Let {aj}j∈J and {cj}j∈J be families of Hilbert
spaces and let B be a Hilbert space such that5
B ∼=
⊕
j∈J
aj ⊗ cj , (7)
holds. Let us furthermore denote by V =
⊕
j∈J Vajcj←B the corresponding isomorphism.
It is convenient to treat
⊕
j aj ⊗ cj as a subspace of the product a⊗ c of the spaces
a =
⊕
j∈J
aj and c =
⊕
j∈J
cj .
The mapping V may then be viewed as an embedding of B into a ⊗ c. Given a density
operator ρB , we denote by ρac the density operator V ρBV
†. More generally, for a multi-
partite density operator ρAB, we write ρAac for V ρABV
†. Furthermore, for any j ∈ J , we
denote by ρAajcj the projection of ρAac onto the subspace defined by aj ⊗ cj, i.e.,
ρAajcj = Vajcj←BρABV
†
ajcj←B . (8)
5
⊕ denotes the orthogonal direct sum.
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A tri-partite density operator ρABC is said to obey the Markov chain condition A ↔
B ↔ C if there exists a decomposition of B of the form (7) such that
ρABC ∼= ρAacC =
⊕
j∈J
qj ρ¯Aaj ⊗ ρ¯cjC (9)
where {qj}j∈J is a probability distribution and {ρ¯Aaj}j∈J and {ρ¯cjC}j∈J are families of
density operators [38, 27, 25]. It follows from this decomposition that a state ρABC obeying
the Markov chain condition can be reconstructed from ρAB with a map TBC←B acting only
on B [38]:
ρABC = IA ⊗ TBC←B(ρAB) . (10)
2.3 Entropic quantities
The formulation of the main claim refers to smooth entropies, which can be defined as
follows.
Definition 2.2. For any density operator ρAB and for ε ∈ [0, 1] the ε-smooth min- and
max-entropies of A conditioned on B are
Hεmin(A|B)ρ = − log inf
ρ˜AB
inf
σB
∥∥∥ρ˜ 12ABσ− 12B ∥∥∥2∞
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = log inf
ρ˜AB
sup
σB
∥∥∥ρ˜ 12ABσ 12B∥∥∥2
1
,
respectively, where ρ˜ is any non-negative operator that is ε-close to ρ in terms of the purified
distance [53, 50], and where σB is any density operator on B.
The proof we present here heavily relies on the sandwiched relative Re´nyi entropies
introduced in [58, 36]. These relative entropies can be used to define a conditional entropy.6
Definition 2.3. For any density operator ρAB and for α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) the sandwiched
α-Re´nyi entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hα(A|B)ρ = − 1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥ρ 12ABρ−α′2B
∥∥∥∥
2
2α
,
where α′ = α−1α and where ‖X‖α = tr
(√
X†X
α) 1
α .
We note that, while the function X 7→ ‖X‖α is a norm for α > 1, this is not the case
for α < 1 since it does not satisfy the triangle inequality. Some key properties of this
function are summarised in Appendix A. Using them, the sandwiched Re´nyi entropies may
be rewritten as
Hα(A|B)ρ = α
1− α log
∥∥∥ρ 1−α2αB ρABρ 1−α2αB ∥∥∥
α
=
1
1− α log tr
((
ρ
1−α
2α
B ρABρ
1−α
2α
B
)α)
.
It turns out that there are multiple ways of defining conditional entropies from relative
entropies. Another variant that will be needed in this work is the following:
6We note that there are at least two common variants for how to define a conditional entropy based on
a relative entropy. We refer to Appendix B for more details.
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Definition 2.4. For any density operator ρAB and for α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), we define
H↑α(A|B)ρ = − inf
σB
1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥ρ 12ABσ−α′2B
∥∥∥∥
2
2α
,
where the infimum is over all sub-normalised density operators on B.
Other relevant facts about the sandwiched Re´nyi entropy and the corresponding notion
of relative entropy can be found in Appendix B.
3 Chain rule for Re´nyi entropies
As explained in the introduction, our main result can be regarded as a generalisation of the
Quantum Asymptotic Equipartition Property [52], corresponding to (2). The approach used
for the proof of the latter is to bound both the smooth min-entropy and the von Neumann
entropy by Re´nyi entropies with an appropriate parameter α. The IID assumption is then
used to decompose the Re´nyi entropy into a sum of n terms. However, since our main claim,
Eq. (3), is supposed to hold for general non-IID states, we do not have this luxury, and we
must somehow decompose the Re´nyi entropy into n terms using other means. The tool we
will use for this purpose is a chain rule for Re´nyi entropies, which we present as a separate
theorem (Theorem 3.2). We start by stating a more general version that will be useful in
the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma 3.1. Let ρA1A2B and σB be density operators and let α ∈ (0,∞). Then
Dα(ρA1B‖idA1 ⊗ σB)−Dα(ρA1A2B‖idA1A2 ⊗ σB) = Hα(A2|A1B)ν ,
where
νA1A2B = ν
1
2
A1B
ρA2|A1Bν
1
2
A1B
with νA1B =
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
σ
1−α
α
B ρ
1
2
A1B
)α
tr
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
σ
1−α
α
B ρ
1
2
A1B
)α . (11)
We note that νA1B = trA2(νA1A2B), which justifies the notation.
Proof. When α = 1, this equality follows directly from the definition of the entropies. To
prove the equality for α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) we consider a purification |ψ〉A1A2BE of ρA1A2B.
Using Lemma B.2 and setting α′ = α−1α we have
Dα(ρA1A2B‖idA1A2 ⊗ σB)
= sup
τE
1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥σ−α′2B ⊗ τ α′2E |ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
2
= sup
τE
1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥
(
σ
−α′
2
B ρ
1
2
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
)
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
2
= sup
τE
1
α′
log tr
((
σ
−α′
2
B ρ
1
2
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
)
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉〈ψ|ρ−
1
2
A1B
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
σ
−α′
2
B ⊗ τ
α′
2
E
))
= sup
τE
1
α′
log tr
((
ρ
1
2
A1B
σ−α
′
B ρ
1
2
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
)
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉〈ψ|ρ−
1
2
A1B
(
idA1B ⊗ τ
α′
2
E
))
.
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By the definition of νA1B, we get
Dα(ρA1A2B‖idA1A2 ⊗ σB)
=
1
α′
log
(
tr
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
σ−α
′
B ρ
1
2
A1B
)α) 1α
+ sup
τE
1
α′
log tr
((
ν
1
α
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
)
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉〈ψ|ρ−
1
2
A1B
(
idA1A2B ⊗ τ
α′
2
E
))
= Dα(ρA1B‖idA1 ⊗ σB)
+ sup
τE
1
α′
log tr
((
ν
−α′
2
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
)
ν
1
2
A1B
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉〈ψ|ρ−
1
2
A1B
ν
1
2
A1B
(
ν
−α′
2
A1B
⊗ τ
α′
2
E
))
= Dα(ρA1B‖idA1 ⊗ σB) + sup
τE
1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥ν−α′2A1B ⊗ τ α′2E |ν〉
∥∥∥∥
2
,
where we defined the pure state |ν〉A1A2BE = ν
1
2
A1B
ρ
− 1
2
A1B
|ψ〉, which is a purification of νA1A2B.
To conclude we use the fact that νA1B = trA2(νA1A2B) and Lemma B.2.
By choosing σB = ρB in Lemma 3.1, we directly obtain a chain rule for the Re´nyi
entropies:
Theorem 3.2. Let ρA1A2B be a density operator and let α ∈ (0,∞). Then
Hα(A1A2|B)ρ = Hα(A1|B)ρ +Hα(A2|A1B)ν , (12)
where
νA1A2B = ν
1
2
A1B
ρA2|A1Bν
1
2
A1B
with νA1B =
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
ρ
1−α
α
B ρ
1
2
A1B
)α
tr
(
ρ
1
2
A1B
ρ
1−α
α
B ρ
1
2
A1B
)α . (13)
One drawback of the above result is that we are seldom interested in the particular state
ν defined in the theorem statement. It is therefore generally more useful to present the result
in a slightly weaker form, where the state ν is chosen to be the worst case over an appropriate
class of density operators. When ρ obeys the Markov chain condition A1 ↔ B1 ↔ B2, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.3. Let ρA1B1A2B2 be a density operator such that the Markov chain condition
A1 ↔ B1 ↔ B2 holds and let α ∈ (0,∞). Then
inf
ν
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)ν 6 Hα(A1A2|B1B2)ρ −Hα(A1|B1)ρ 6 sup
ν
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)ν (14)
where the supremum and infimum range over density operators ν such that νA2B2|A1B1 =
ρA2B2|A1B1 holds.
Proof. We apply Theorem 3.2 with B = B1B2. The Markov chain condition implies that
Hα(A1|B1B2)ρ = Hα(A1|B1)ρ. To see this for α ∈ (12 ,∞), we could use the recoverability
condition (10) for Markov chains together with the monotonicity of Dα under quantum
channels [36, 58, 8, 23]. We can also see it for all α ∈ (0,∞) using the structure of a Markov
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chain stated in (9). Namely, there exists a decomposition
⊕
j aj ⊗ bj of the system B1 such
that
ρA1B1B2
∼=
⊕
j
qj ρ¯A1aj ⊗ ρ¯bjB2 (15)
holds, where {qj} is a probability distribution and where {ρ¯Aaj} and {ρ¯bjB} are families of
density operators. Then,
Hα(A1|B1B2)ρ = 1
1− α log tr
((
ρ
−α′
2
B1B2
ρA1B1B2ρ
−α′
2
B1B2
)α)
=
1
1− α log tr

⊕
j
qj
(
ρ¯
−α′
2
aj ⊗ ρ
−α′
2
bjB2
(
ρ¯A1aj ⊗ ρ¯bjB2
)
ρ¯
−α′
2
aj ⊗ ρ
−α′
2
bjB2
)α
=
1
1− α log tr

⊕
j
qj
(
ρ¯
−α′
2
aj ρ¯A1aj ρ¯
−α′
2
aj
)α ⊗ ρ¯bjB2

 = Hα(A1|B1)ρ .
To prove (14), it only remains to show that the state νA1A2B1B2 defined in (13) satisfies
νA2B2|A1B1 = ρA2B2|A1B1 . For that, we again use the fact that ρA1B1B2 forms a Markov
chain. Letting Z = tr
(
ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
ρ−α
′
B1B2
ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
)α
, the decomposition (15) allows us to write
νA1B1B2 =
1
Z
(
ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
ρ−α
′
B1B2
ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
)α
(16)
=
1
Z

⊕
j
q1−α
′
j ρ¯
1
2
A1aj
ρ¯−α
′
aj ρ¯
1
2
A1aj
⊗ ρ¯1−α′bjB2


α
(17)
=
1
Z
⊕
j
qj
(
ρ¯
1
2
A1aj
ρ¯−α
′
aj ρ¯
1
2
A1aj
)α
⊗ ρ¯bjB2 . (18)
It follows that
ν
− 1
2
A1B1
ν
1
2
A1B1B2
=
⊕
j
idA1aj ⊗ ρ¯−
1
2
bj
ρ¯
1
2
bjB2
(19)
= ρ¯
− 1
2
A1B1
ρ¯
1
2
A1B1B2
. (20)
As a result, we find
νA2B2|A1B1 = ν
− 1
2
A1B1
ν
1
2
A1B1B2
ρA2|A1B1B2ν
1
2
A1B1B2
ν
− 1
2
A1B1
(21)
= ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
ρA2|A1B1B2ρ
1
2
A1B1B2
ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
(22)
= ρA2B2|A1B1 . (23)
The following simple corollary expresses the above chain rules in terms of quantum
channels, i.e., trace preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps, rather than conditional
states.
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Corollary 3.4. Let ρ0RA1B1 be a density operator on R ⊗ A1 ⊗ B1 and M = MA2B2←R
be a TPCP map. Assuming that ρA1B1A2B2 = M(ρ0RA1B1) satisfies the Markov condition
A1 ↔ B1 ↔ B2, we have
inf
ω
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)M(ω) 6 Hα(A1A2|B1B2)M(ρ0) −Hα(A1|B1)ρ0 6 sup
ω
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)M(ω)
where the supremum and infimum range over density operators ωRA1B1 on R ⊗ A1 ⊗ B1.
Moreover, if ρ0RA1B1 is pure then we can optimise over pure states ωRA1B1 .
Proof. We apply Theorem 3.3 to ρA1B1A2B2 . It suffices to show that the optimisation over
νA1B1A2B2 satisfying νA2B2|A1B1 = ρA2B2|A1B1 is contained in the optimisation over ωRA1B1 .
For this, let νA1B1A2B2 be any density operator satisfying νA2B2|A1B1 = ρA2B2|A1B1 , i.e.,
νA1B1A2B2 = ν
1
2
A1B1
ρA2B2|A1B1ν
1
2
A1B1
. (24)
Now we choose
ωRA1B1 = ν
1
2
A1B1
ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
ρ0RA1B1ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
ν
1
2
A1B1
.
We then see that
M(ωRA1B1) = ν
1
2
A1B1
ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
M(ρ0RA1B1)ρ
− 1
2
A1B1
ν
1
2
A1B1
= ν
1
2
A1B1
ρA2B2|A1B1ν
1
2
A1B1
= νA1B1A2B2 .
4 Entropy accumulation
This section is devoted to the main result on entropy accumulation. The statement is
formulated in its fully general form as Theorem 4.4 and presented in a slightly simplified
version as Corollary 4.7. We also give a formulation that corresponds to statement (3) of the
introduction (Corollary 4.8). Finally, we show how the Quantum Asymptotic Equipartition
Property follows as a special case (cf. Corollary 4.9).
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Mi be a TPCP map from Ri−1 to XiAiBiRi, where Ai is finite-
dimensional and where Xi represents a classical value from an alphabet X that is determined
by Ai and Bi together. More precisely, we require that, Mi = Ti ◦ M′i where M′i is an
arbitrary TPCP map from Ri−1 to AiBiRi and Ti is a TPCP map from AiBi to XiAiBi of
the form
Ti(WAiBi) =
∑
y∈Y,z∈Z
(ΠAi,y ⊗ΠBi,z)WAiBi(ΠAi,y ⊗ΠBi,z)⊗ |t(y, z)〉〈t(y, z)|Xi , (25)
where {ΠAi,y} and {ΠBi,z} are families of mutually orthogonal projectors on Ai and Bi, and
where t : Y ×Z → X is a deterministic function (cf. Figs. 1 and 2). Special cases of interest
are when Xi is trivial and Ti is the identity map, and when Xi = t(Yi, Zi) where Yi and Zi
are classical parts of Ai and Bi, respectively. Note that the maps Ti have the property that,
for any operator W¯XiAiBi , if W¯XiAiBi = Ti(WAiBi) then W¯XiAiBi = Ti(W¯AiBi).
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The entropy accumulation theorem stated below will hold for states of the form
ρAn
1
Bn
1
Xn
1
E = (Mn ◦ · · · ◦M1 ⊗ IE)(ρ0R0E) (26)
where ρ0R0E ∈ D(R0⊗E) is a density operator on R0 and an arbitrary system E. In addition,
we require that the Markov conditions
Ai−11 ↔ Bi−11 E ↔ Bi (27)
be satisfied for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let P be the set of probability distributions on the alphabet X of Xi, and let R be a
system isomorphic to Ri−1. For any q ∈ P we define the set of states
Σi(q) =
{
νXiAiBiRiR = (Mi ⊗ IR)(ωRi−1R) : ω ∈ D(Ri−1 ⊗R) and νXi = q
}
,
where νXi denotes the probability distribution over X with the probabilities given by
〈x|νXi |x〉.
Definition 4.1. A real function f on P is called a min- or max-tradeoff function for Mi if
it satisfies
f(q) 6 inf
ν∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)ν or f(q) > sup
ν∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)ν ,
respectively.7
Remark 4.2. To determine the infimum infν∈Σi(q)H(Ai|BiR)ν , we may assume that
ωRi−1R in the definition of Σi(q) is pure. In fact, including a purifying system in R cannot
increase H(Ai|BiR) because of strong subadditivity. Similarly, to calculate the supremum
supν∈Σi(q)H(Ai|BiR)ν , we may assume that ωRi−1R is a product state or that R is trivial.
This justifies the fact that we assumed R is isomorphic to Ri−1 in the definition of Σi(q).
Remark 4.3. As we will see in the proof below, one can also impose the constraint on the
set Σi(q) that the system R be isomorphic to A
i−1
1 B
i−1
1 E. Furthermore, if a part of the
latter is classical in ρ, one can restrict Σi(q) to states satisfying this property.
In the following, we denote by∇f the gradient of a function f . (Note that in Theorem 4.4
and Proposition 4.5 f is an affine function, so that ∇f is a constant.) We write freq(Xn1 ) for
the distribution on X defined by freq(Xn1 )(x) = |{i∈{1,...,n}:Xi=x}|n . We also recall that in this
context, an event Ω is defined by a subset of Xn and we write ρ[Ω] =∑xn1∈Ω tr(ρAn1Bn1 E,xn1 )
for the probability of the event Ω and
ρXn1 An1Bn1 E|Ω =
1
ρ[Ω]
∑
xn1∈Ω
|xn1 〉〈xn1 | ⊗ ρAn1Bn1 E,xn1
for the state conditioned on Ω (cf. Section 2.1).
Theorem 4.4. Let M1, . . . ,Mn and ρAn1Bn1Xn1 E be such that (26) and the Markov condi-
tions (27) hold, let h ∈ R, let f be an affine min-tradeoff function for M1, . . . ,Mn, and let
ε ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any event Ω ⊆ Xn that implies f(freq(Xn1 )) > h,
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > nh− c
√
n (28)
7If the set Σi(q) is empty then the infimum and supremum are by definition equal to ∞ and −∞,
respectively, so that the conditions are trivial.
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holds for c = 2
(
log(1 + 2dA) + ⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉
)√
1− 2 log(ερ[Ω]), where dA is the maximum
dimension of the systems Ai. Similarly,
Hεmax(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω < nh+ c
√
n (29)
holds if f is replaced by an affine max-tradeoff function and if Ω implies f(freq(Xn1 )) 6 h.
Before proceeding to the proof, some remarks are in order. The first is that the Markov
chain assumption on the state is important as argued in Appendix C. Secondly, the system
E could have been included in B1, but for the applications we consider, it is clearer to
keep a separate system E that is not affected by the processes M1, . . . ,Mn. Thirdly, as
for the Quantum Asymptotic Equipartition Property [52], it is possible to replace dA with
appropriate entropic quantities, which could be useful when the systems Ai are infinite-
dimensional. Finally, we note that the constraint that the tradeoff function be affine is not
a severe restriction: given a convex min-tradeoff function, one can always choose a tangent
hyperplane at a point of interest as an affine lower bound. This is done in Corollary 4.7.
To prove the theorem, we will first show the following proposition, which is essentially
a Re´nyi version of entropy accumulation. We then show how Theorem 4.4 follows from this
proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Let M1, . . . ,Mn and ρAn1Bn1Xn1 E be such that (26) and the Markov con-
ditions (27) hold, let h ∈ R, and let f be an affine min-tradeoff function f for M, . . . ,Mn.
Then, for any event Ω which implies f(freq(Xn1 )) > h,
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > nh− n
(
α− 1
4
)
V 2 − α
α− 1 log
1
ρ[Ω]
(30)
holds for α satisfying 1 < α < 1+ 2V , and V = 2 ⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉+2 log(1+ 2dA), where dA is the
maximum dimension of the systems Ai. Similarly,
H 1
α
(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω < nh+ n
(
α− 1
4
)
V 2 +
α
α− 1 log
1
ρ[Ω]
(31)
holds if f is replaced by an affine max-tradeoff function and if Ω implies f(freq(Xn1 )) 6 h.
Proof. We focus on proving the first inequality (30). The proof of the second inequality (31)
is similar, we only point out the main differences in the course of the proof.
The first step of the proof is to construct a state that will allow us to lower-bound
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω using the chain rule of Theorem 3.3, while ensuring that the tradeoff func-
tion is taken into account. Let [gmin, gmax] be the smallest real interval that contains the
range f(P) of f , and set g¯ = 12 (gmin+gmax). Furthermore, for every i, let Di : Xi → XiDiD¯i,
with dimDi = dim D¯i, be a TPCP map defined as
Di(WXi ) =
∑
x∈X
〈x|WXi |x〉 · |x〉〈x|Xi ⊗ τ(x)DiD¯i ,
where τ(x) is a mixture between a maximally entangled state on Di⊗ D¯i and a fully mixed
state such that the marginal on D¯i is uniform and such that Hα(Di|D¯i)τ(x) = g¯ − f(δx)
(here δx stands for the distribution with all the weight on element x). To ensure that
this is possible, we need to choose dimDi large enough, so we need to bound how large
g¯ − f(δx) can be, positive or negative. By the definition of g¯, |g¯ − f(δx)| cannot be larger
12
than 12 |gmax − gmin| 6 ‖∇f‖∞. We therefore take the dimension of the spaces Di to be
equal to
dD :=
⌈
2‖∇f‖∞
⌉
6 2⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉ .
For later use, we note that we have
log(1 + 2dAdD) 6 ⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉+ log(1 + 2dA) = V
2
. (32)
Now, let
ρ¯ := (Dn ◦ · · · ◦ D1)(ρ) .
Note that ρ¯Xn
1
An
1
Bn
1
E = ρXn
1
An
1
Bn
1
E .
One can think of the D systems as an “entropy price” that encodes the tradeoff function.
With these systems in place, the output entropy includes an extra term that allows the
tradeoff function to be taken into account in the optimisation arising in Theorem 3.3. This
is formalised by the following facts, which are proven in Claim 4.6:
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > H↑α(An1Dn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ|Ω − ng¯ + nh , (33)
H 1
α
(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω 6 H 1α (A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ|Ω − ng¯ + nh . (34)
The next step is to relate the entropies on the conditional state ρ|Ω to those on the uncondi-
tional state. To do this, we use Lemmas B.5 and B.6 applied to ρ¯ = ρ[Ω]ρ¯|Ω+(ρ¯− ρ[Ω]ρ¯|Ω),
together with the fact that H↑α > Hα, and obtain
8
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > Hα(An1Dn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ −
α
α− 1 log
1
ρ[Ω]
− ng¯ + nh , (35)
H 1
α
(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω 6 H 1α (A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ +
α
α− 1 log
1
ρ[Ω]
− ng¯ + nh . (36)
To show the desired inequality (30), it now suffices to prove that Hα(A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ is
lower bounded by (roughly) ng¯. To do that, we are now going to use the chain rule for Re´nyi
entropies in the form of Corollary 3.4 n times on the state ρ¯, with the following substitutions
at step i:
• A1 → Ai−11 Di−11
• B1 → Bi−11 ED¯i−11
• A2 → AiDi
• B2 → BiD¯i.
Recall that the state on Di−11 is completely determined by the state on D¯
i−1
1 and X
i−1
1 ,
where the latter is, by assumption, completely determined by Ai−11 and B
i−1
1 , so that the
Markov chain conditionsDi−11 ↔ Ai−11 Bi−11 ED¯i−11 ↔ BiD¯i hold. Furthermore, the assumed
Markov chain conditions for ρAn
1
Bn
1
E together with the fact that the state on D¯
n
1 is uniform
8Note that the reason why we use H↑α in one case but not the other is due to the difference between
Lemmas B.5 and B.6.
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independently of An1B
n
1E implies the Markov chain conditions A
i−1
1 ↔ Bi−11 ED¯i−11 ↔ BiD¯i.
Combining these Markov chain conditions implies the Markov chain conditions Ai−11 D
i−1
1 ↔
Bi−11 ED¯
i−1
1 ↔ BiD¯i, which are the ones required to apply Corollary 3.4. We thus obtain
Hα(A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ >
∑
i
inf
ωRi−1R
Hα(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω)
>
∑
i
inf
ωRi−1R
H(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω) − n(α− 1) log2(1 + 2dAdD)
>
∑
i
inf
ωRi−1R
H(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω) − n
(α− 1)
4
V 2 ,
where we have invoked Lemma B.9 in the second inequality and (32) in the last. Note that
the restriction of this lemma that α satisfy 1 < α < 1+ 1/ log(1 + 2dAdD) is implied by our
assumption that α < 1+2/V . The infimum is taken over all states ωRi−1R, where the system
R is isomorphic to Ai−11 D
i−1
1 B
i−1
1 D¯
i−1
1 E. This condition can be further strengthened by
redoing the above argument with Theorem 3.2 instead of Corollary 3.4. It turns out that
the system R can be taken to be isomorphic to Ai−11 B
i−1
1 E, as noted in Remark 4.3.
9
For any such state ωRi−1R, we have
H(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω) = H(AiXiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω)
= H(AiXi|BiR)Mi(ω) +H(Di|D¯iXi)(Di◦Mi)(ω)
= H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
∑
x
q(x)H(Di|D¯i)τ(x)
> H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
∑
x
q(x)Hα(Di|D¯i)τ(x)
= H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
∑
x
q(x)
(
g¯ − f(δx)
)
= H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) + g¯ − f(q)
> g¯
where q = Mi(ω)Xi denotes the distribution of Xi on X obtained from the state Mi(ω).
The third equality comes from the fact that Xi is determined by AiBi. The first inequality
follows from the monotonicity of the Re´nyi entropies in α [8, 36]. The last equality holds
because f is affine and the final inequality because f is a min-tradeoff function. Putting
everything together, Eq. (35) becomes
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > nh− n
(α− 1)
4
V 2 − α− 1
α
log
1
ρ[Ω]
.
This concludes the proof of the first inequality (30) of Proposition 4.5.
In order to show the second inequality (31), using the same argument as before, we
obtain
H 1
α
(An1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ <
∑
i
sup
ωRi−1R
H(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω) + n
(α− 1)
4
V 2 ,
9The full proof of this fact is available in the source code of this file on the arXiv. To access it, follow
the instructions on the line labelled “EXTRA” in the preamble.
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where the supremum is over all states ωRi−1R with R constrained as described by Remark 4.3.
For any such state and a max-tradeoff function f , we have
H(AiDi|BiD¯iR)(Di◦Mi)(ω) 6 H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
∑
x
q(x)H 1
α
(Di|D¯i)τ(x)
= H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) +
∑
x
q(x)
(
g¯ − f(δx)
)
= H(Ai|BiR)Mi(ω) + g¯ − f(q)
6 g¯ .
It then suffices to combine these inequalities with inequality (36).
We now prove the claim used in the preceding proof.
Claim 4.6. For α ∈ (1, 2],
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > H↑α(An1Dn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ − ng¯ + nh , (37)
H 1
α
(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω 6 H 1α (A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯ − ng¯ + nh . (38)
Proof. We focus on proving inequality (37). The first step is to show that as Xn1 is a
deterministic function of An1B
n
1 , we have
H↑α(A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω = H↑α(An1Xn1Dn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω . (39)
In order to do that, observe that for any xn1 ∈ Xn, we have
ρ¯An1Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 ,xn1 = ρA
n
1B
n
1 E,x
n
1
⊗ τ(xn1 )Dn1 D¯n1 ,
where we introduced the notation τ(xn1 )Dn1 D¯n1 = τ(x1)D1D¯1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τ(xn)DnD¯n . This implies
that for any xn1 , we have
ρ¯Xn1 An1Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 ,xn1 = (Tn ◦ · · · ◦ T1)(ρ¯An1Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 ,xn1 ) .
By taking the sum over xn1 ∈ Ω and then normalising by ρ[Ω], we get
ρ¯Xn1 An1Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 |Ω = (Tn ◦ · · · ◦ T1)(ρ¯An1Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 |Ω) .
Thus, we can apply Lemma B.7 and prove the equality (39).
Let now σBn1 ED¯n1 be a state such that
H↑α(A
n
1X
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω = −Dα(ρ¯An1Xn1 Dn1Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ω‖idAn1Xn1 Dn1 ⊗ σBn1 ED¯n1 ) .
Let furthermore S = SDD¯ be the TPCP map that applies a random (according to the Haar
measure) unitary to D and its conjugate to D¯ (in such a way that the maximally entangled
state on DD¯ used to define τ(x) is preserved). It is then easy to see that the map S⊗n
applied to the n pairs DiD¯i leaves ρ¯|Ω invariant. Hence, by the data processing inequality
H↑α(A
n
1X
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω 6 −Dα(S⊗n(ρ¯An1Xn1 Dn1Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ω)‖S
⊗n(idAn
1
Xn
1
Dn
1
⊗ σBn1 ED¯n1 ))
= −Dα(ρ¯An1Xn1 Dn1Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ω‖idAn1Xn1 Dn1 ⊗ σ¯Bn1 ED¯n1 ) ,
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where σ¯Bn1 ED¯n1 = σB
n
1 E
⊗ ρ¯D¯n1 . Lemma 3.1 then implies that
H↑α(A
n
1X
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω 6 H↑α(An1Xn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω +Hα(Dn1 |An1Xn1 Bn1ED¯n1 )ν . (40)
where ν is a state defined by
νAn1Xn1 Bn1 ED¯n1 =
(
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1 |Ω
σ¯−α
′
Bn1 ED¯
n
1
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1 |Ω
)α
tr
(
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1 |Ω
σ¯−α
′
Bn1 ED¯
n
1
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1 |Ω
)α and
νAn1Xn1 Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 = ν
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1
ρ¯Dn1 |An1Xn1 Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ων
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 ED¯
n
1
.
We now use properties of ρ|Ω and σ¯ to simplify the expression of ν. Observing that
ρ¯Xn1 An1Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ω =
1
ρ[Ω]
∑
xn1∈Ω
|xn1 〉〈xn1 | ⊗ ρA1Bn1 E,xn1 ⊗ ρ¯D¯n1 , (41)
we can write
νAn1Xn1 Bn1 ED¯n1 =
∑
xn1∈Ω
|xn1 〉〈xn1 | ⊗ νAn1Bn1 E,xn1 ⊗ ρ¯D¯n1 ,
with νAn
1
Bn
1
E,xn
1
=
1
ρ[Ω]α
(
ρ
1
2
An1B
n
1 E,x
n
1
σ
1−α
α
Bn1 E
ρ
1
2
An1B
n
1 E,x
n
1
)α
tr
(
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 E|Ωσ
1−α
α
Bn1 E
ρ¯
1
2
An1X
n
1 B
n
1 E|Ω
)α .
In addition, as ρ¯|Ω is of the form
ρ¯An1Xn1 Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 |Ω =
1
ρ[Ω]
∑
xn1∈Ω
|xn1 〉〈xn1 |Xn1 ⊗ ρAn1Bn1 E,xn1 ⊗ τ(xn1 )Dn1 D¯n1 ,
we have
ρ¯Dn1 |An1Xn1 Bn1 ED¯n1 |Ω =
∑
xn1∈Ω
|xn1 〉〈xn1 |Xn1 ⊗ ρ0An1Bn1 E,xn1 ⊗ τ(x
n
1 )Dn1 |D¯n1 ,
where ρ0An1Bn1 E,xn1 is the projector onto the support of ρA
n
1B
n
1 E,x
n
1
. Hence,
νAn1Xn1 Bn1 EDn1 D¯n1 =
∑
xn1∈Xn
|xn1 〉〈xn1 | ⊗ νAn1Bn1 E,xn1 ⊗ τ(xn1 )Dn1 D¯n1 . (42)
Getting back to the inequality (40), we have H↑α(A
n
1X
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω = H↑α(An1 |Bn1E)ρ¯|Ω
using Eq. (41) to drop D¯n1 and Lemma B.7 to drop X
n
1 . Moreover, using (42), we have that
Hα(D
n
1 |An1Xn1Bn1ED¯n1 )ν = Hα(Dn1 |Xn1 D¯n1 )ν . Finally, we get
H↑α(A
n
1D
n
1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω 6 H↑α(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω +Hα(Dn1 |D¯n1Xn1 )ν . (43)
It is a direct consequence of the definition of τ(x) that
Hα(D
n
1 |D¯n1 )τ(xn1 ) = ng¯ −
n∑
i=1
f(δxi)
= ng¯ − n
∑
x∈X
freq(xn1 )(x)f(δx) = ng¯ − nf
(∑
x∈X
freq(xn1 )(x)δx
)
= ng¯ − nf(freq(xn1 )) ,
16
where we have used that f is an affine function. Using Lemma B.3 and (42) we can bound
the second term on the right hand side of (43) by
Hα(D
n
1 |D¯n1Xn1 )ν 6 max
xn
1
∈Ω
Hα(D
n
1 |D¯n1 )τ(xn1 )
6 max
xn1 : f(freq(x
n
1 ))>h
ng¯ − nf(freq(xn1 )) 6 ng¯ − nh .
Inserting this in (43) gives
H↑α(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > H↑α(An1Dn1 |Bn1ED¯n1 )ρ¯|Ω − ng¯ + nh .
This concludes the proof of inequality (37). For the proof of inequality (38), we can follow
similar steps.10
Finally, we prove Theorem 4.4 using Proposition 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The first step is to use Lemma B.10 to lower-bound the smooth min-
entropy by a Re´nyi entropy:
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > H↑α(An1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω −
g(ε)
α− 1 . (44)
Then Proposition 4.5 yields
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > nh− n
(α− 1)
4
V 2 − 1
α′
log
1
ρ[Ω]
− g(ε)
α− 1
> nh− n (α− 1)
4
V 2 − 1
α′
log
1
ρ[Ω]
− log(2/ε
2)
α− 1
> nh− n (α− 1)
4
V 2 − 1
(α− 1) log
2
ρ[Ω]2ε2
,
where we have used the fact that we are constrained to choose α 6 1 + 2V 6 2 in the last
inequality. We now choose
α := 1 +
2
√
log 2ρ[Ω]2ε2√
nV
. (45)
and note that, as long as
n > log
2
ρ[Ω]2ε2
, (46)
the value α is strictly smaller than 1 + 2V and therefore within the required bounds. Note
also that if (46) does not hold then the term c
√
n in the claim (28) is at least nV >
2n log(1 + 2dA) > 2n log dA, whereas the min-entropy is always at least −n log dA and
10The full proof of this case is available in the source code of this file on the arXiv. To access it, follow
the instructions on the line labelled “EXTRA” in the preamble.
17
nfmin(q) is at most n log dA, which means that the claim is trivial. Finally, inserting (45)
into the above yields
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ > nh−
√
nV
√
log
2
ρ[Ω]2ε2
,
as advertised. Once again, the max-entropy statement (29) holds by switching the direction
of the inequalities, flipping the appropriate signs, and replacing every occurrence of H↑α
by H 1
α
.
One natural choice for the event Ω is that the empirical distribution freq(Xn1 ) takes a
particular value q. This yields the following corollary to Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.7. Let M1, . . . ,Mn and ρAn1Bn1Xn1 E be such that (26) and the Markov con-
ditions (27) hold. Then, for any differentiable and convex min-tradeoff function f for
M1, . . . ,Mn and for any q ∈ P, we have
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|q > nf(q)− c
√
n
where c = 2
(
log(1 + 2dA) + ⌈‖∇f(q)‖∞⌉
)√
1− 2 log(ερ[q]), where ρ|q denotes the state ρ
conditioned on the event that freq(Xn1 ) = q, and ρ[q] the probability of this event.
Note that an analogous statement holds of course for the max-entropy, replacing f by a
concave max-tradeoff function and changing the inequality accordingly.
Proof. For any fixed q ∈ P, let fq be the hyperplane in P tangent to the min-tradeoff function
f at the point q. This means that∇fq = ∇f(q) and that fq is a lower bound on f . The latter
implies that fq is also a min-tradeoff function. Furthermore, let h = f(q) and define Ω as the
event that freq(Xn1 ) = q. The event Ω then implies that fq(freq(X
n
1 )) = fq(q) = f(q) = h.
Theorem 4.4, applied to the min-tradeoff function fq, thus gives the desired claim.
The following corollary specialises the above to the formulation (3). We provide the
statement for the case of the lower boundary.
Corollary 4.8. Let M1, . . . ,Mn and ρAn1Bn1 E be such that (26) and the Markov condi-
tions (27) hold. Then
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ >
n∑
i=1
inf
ωRi−1R
H(Ai|BiR)(Mi⊗IR)(ωRi−1R) − c
√
n
where c = 3(log(1 + 2dA)
)√
1− 2 log(ε).
Proof. The maps Mi can without loss of generality be modified such that their output Xi
is a constant Xi = i. The values X1, . . . , Xn can then be regarded as random variables with
alphabet X = {1, . . . , n}. It is easy to verify that the real function f on P defined by
f(q) =
n∑
i=1
q(i) inf
ωRi−1R
H(Ai|BiR)(Mi⊗IR)(ωRi−1R)
is a min-tradeoff function for all Mi. We now fix q ∈ P such that q(1) = · · · = q(n) = 1n , in
which case the event freq(Xn1 ) = q occurs with certainty. Because
‖∇f(q)‖∞ 6 log dA
the claim follows immediately from Corollary 4.7.
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As indicated in the introduction, in the special case where the individual pairs (Ai, Bi)
are independent and identically distributed (IID), the entropy accumulation theorem corre-
sponds to the Quantum Asymptotic Equipartition Property [52]. We can therefore formulate
the latter as a corollary of Theorem 4.4.11
Corollary 4.9. For any bipartite state νAB, any n ∈ N, and any ε ∈ (0, 1),
1
n
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 )ν⊗n > H(A|B)ν − 2
√
1− 2 log ε
n
log(1 + 2dA) .
Proof. Let, for any i = 1, . . . , n, Mi be the TPCP map from R to XABR which sets AB
to state νAB and where X and R are trivial (one-dimensional) systems. The concatenation
of these maps thus generates the state ρAn
1
Bn
1
= ν⊗nAB. The claim is then obtained from
Theorem 4.4 with the trade-off function f being a constant equal to h = H(A|B)ν and with
Ω as the certain event.
5 Applications
Entropy is a rather general notion and, accordingly, entropy accumulation has applications
in various areas of physics, information theory, and computer science. An example from
physics is the phenomena of thermalisation. It is known that a system can only thermalise
if its smooth min-entropy is sufficiently large [18]. To illustrate how Theorem 4.4 could give
an estimate of this entropy, consider a system of interest (e.g., a cup of coffee) which is in
contact with a large environment (the air around it). Suppose that, for an appropriately
chosen discretisation of the evolution, the system interacts at each time step with a different
part of the environment (e.g., with different air molecules bouncing off the coffee cup).12
Theorem 4.4 then provides a bound on the total entropy that is transferred to the envi-
ronment in terms of the von Neumann entropy transferred in each time step. Because the
joint time evolution of system and environment is unitary, this entropy flow to the environ-
ment could be expressed in terms of the entropy change of the system itself. The argument
would therefore prove that the total entropy acquired by the system over many time steps
is bounded by the sum of the entropies produced in each individual time step.
Another area where the notion of entropy plays a crucial role is quantum cryptography.
Many proofs of security of cryptographic protocols involve lower-bounding the uncertainty
that a dishonest adversary has about some system of interest. The state-of-the-art is to
derive such bounds using a combination of de Finetti-type theorems as well as the Quantum
Asymptotic Equipartition Property [40, 41, 15, 4]. However, the use of de Finetti theorems
comes with various disadvantages. Firstly, they are only applicable under certain assump-
tions on the symmetry of the protocols. Secondly, they introduce additional error terms that
can be large in the practically relevant finite-size regime [46]. Finally, it is not known how
to apply de Finetti theorems in a device-independent scenario (see [20] for an overview and
references on device-independent cryptography). These problems can all be circumvented by
the use of entropy accumulation, as demonstrated in [5] for the case of device-independent
quantum key distribution and randomness expansion. The resulting security statements are
valid against general attacks and essentially optimal in the finite-size regime.
11In the version of [52], the term 1 + 2dA in the logarithm is replaced by an expression that depends on
the entropy of A conditioned on B.
12In statistical mechanics this is formally described by the Repeated Interaction System (RIS) model [7, 14].
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In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the use of entropy accumulation with
two concrete examples. The first is a security proof for a basic quantum key distribution
protocol, which follows the structure of the more general proof presented in [5]. The second
is a novel derivation of an upper bound on the fidelity of fully quantum random access codes.
5.1 Sample application: Security of quantum key distribution
A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol enables two parties, Alice and Bob, to estab-
lish a common secret key, i.e., a string of random bits unknown to a potential eavesdropper,
Eve. The setting is such that Alice and Bob can communicate over a quantum channel,
which may however be fully controlled by Eve. In addition, Alice and Bob have a classical
communication link which is assumed to be authenticated, i.e., Eve may read but cannot
alter the classical messages exchanged between Alice and Bob. The protocol is said to be
secure against general attacks if any attack by Eve is either detected (in which case the
protocol aborts) or does not compromise the secrecy of the final key.
For concreteness, we consider here a variant of the E91 QKD protocol [21] (and note that
any security proof for this protocol also implies security of the BB84 protocol [10, 11]). The
protocol consists of a sequence of instructions for Alice and Bob, as described in the box
below. These depend on certain parameters, including the number, n, of qubits that need
to be transmitted over the quantum channel, the maximum tolerated noise level, e, of this
channel, as well as the key rate, r, which is defined as the number of final key bits divided
by n. In the first protocol step, Alice and Bob need to measure their qubits at random
in one of two mutually unbiased bases, which we term the computational and the diagonal
basis. These are chosen with probability 1− µ and µ, respectively, for some µ ∈ (0, 1). The
protocol also invokes an error correction scheme, termed EC, which allows Bob to infer a
string held by Alice from noisy information about it. For this, Alice needs to send classical
error correcting information to Bob, whose maximum relative length is characterised by
another parameter, ϑEC. We assume that EC is reliable. This means that, except with
negligible probability, Bob either obtains a correct copy of Alice’s string or he is notified
that the string cannot be inferred.13
The security of QKD against general attacks has been established in a sequence of
works [31, 32, 48, 13, 40]. Specifically, for the E91 protocol, the following result has been
shown.
Theorem 5.1. The E91 protocol is secure for any choice of protocol parameters satisfying14
r < 1−HSh(e)− ϑEC − 2µ , (47)
provided that n is sufficiently large.
Note that, because µ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, the theorem implies that the
E91 protocol can generate secret keys at an asymptotic rate of 1 −HSh(e)− ϑEC. We now
show how this result can be obtained using the notion of entropy accumulation.
Proof. According to a standard result on two-universal hashing (see, for instance, Corol-
lary 5.6.1 of [40]), the key F (AS) computed in the privacy amplification step is secret to
an adversary holding information E′ if the smooth min-entropy of AS conditioned on E′ is
13Any error correction scheme can be turned into a reliable one by appending a test where Alice and Bob
compare a hash value computed from their (corrected) strings.
14HSh(e) = −e log e− (1 − e) log(1 − e) is the binary Shannon entropy.
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The E91 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Protocol parameters
n ∈ N : number of uses of qubit channel
µ ∈ (0, 1) : probability for measurements in diagonal basis
e ∈ (0, 12 ) : maximum tolerated phase error ratio
ϑEC ∈ [0, 1] : relative communication cost of error correction scheme EC
r ∈ [0, 1] : key rate
Protocol steps
1. Distribution: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Alice prepares a pair (Qi, Q¯i) of entangled qubits
and sends Q¯i to Bob. Alice generates a random bit Bi such that PBi(1) = µ and,
depending on whether Bi = 0 or Bi = 1, measures Qi in either the computational
or the diagonal basis, storing the outcome as Ai. In the same way, Bob measures
Q¯i in a basis determined by a random bit B¯i, storing the outcome as A¯i.
2. Sifting and information reconciliation: Alice and Bob announce Bi and B¯i and
determine the set S of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Bi = B¯i. They invoke the
error correction scheme EC, allowing Bob to compute a guess AˆS for Alice’s string
AS = (Ai)i∈S . If EC does not output a guess then the protocol is aborted.
3. Parameter estimation: Bob counts the number of indices i ∈ S for which B¯i = 1
and A¯i 6= Aˆi. If this number is larger than eµ2n then the protocol is aborted.
4. Privacy amplification: Alice chooses a function F at random from a two-universal
set of hash functions [57] from |S| bits to ⌊rn⌋ bits and announces F to Bob. Both
Alice and Bob compute the final key as F (AS) and F (AˆS), respectively.
sufficiently larger than the output size of the hash function F . Since, in our case, this size
is ⌊rn⌋, the condition reads
nr 6 Hεmin(AS |E′)ρ|Ω −O(1) , (48)
where the entropy is evaluated for the joint state ρ|Ω of AS and E′ conditioned on the
event Ω that the protocol is not aborted and that Bob’s guess AˆS of AS is correct. The
smoothing parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) specifies the desired level of secrecy,15 and we assume here
that it is constant (independent of n). Because conditioning the smooth min-entropy of a
classical variable on an additional bit cannot decrease its value by more than 1 (see, e.g.,
Proposition 5.10 of [50]), we may bound the smooth min-entropy in (48) by
Hεmin(AS |E′)ρ|Ω > Hεmin(AS |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω − |S|ϑEC > Hεmin(AS |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω − nϑEC , (49)
where E denotes all information held by Eve after the distribution step, and where |S|ϑEC
is the maximum number of bits exchanged for error correction. Note that we also included
the basis information Bn1 and B¯
n
1 in the conditioning part because Eve may obtain this
information during the sifting and information reconciliation step. We are thus left with
the task of lower bounding Hεmin(AS |Bn1 B¯n1E)|ρ|Ω , which is usually the central part of any
15Roughly, ε corresponds to the maximum probability by which one could encounter a deviation from
perfect secrecy [39].
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security proof. Since it is also the part where entropy accumulation is used, we formulate it
separately as Claim 5.2 below. Inserting this claim into (49), we conclude that the secrecy
condition (48) is fulfilled whenever
nr 6 n
(
1−HSh(e)− ϑEC − 2µ
)− o(n)
holds. But this is clearly the case for any choice of parameters satisfying (47), provided
that n is sufficiently large.
It remains to show the separate claim, which we do using entropy accumulation.
Claim 5.2. Let An1 , B
n
1 , B¯
n
1 , and S be the information held by Alice and Bob as defined by
the protocol, let E be the information gathered by Eve during the distribution step, and let Ω
be the event that the protocol is not aborted and that Bob’s guess AˆS of AS is correct. Then,
provided that Ω has a non-negligible probability (i.e., it does not decrease exponentially fast
in n),
Hεmin(AS |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω > n
(
1− 2µ−HSh(e)
)− o(n) . (50)
Proof. Let ρ0
Qn1 Q¯
n
1E
be the joint state of Alice and Bob’s qubit pairs before measurement,
together with the information E gathered by Eve during the distribution step, and let
ρAn1 A¯n1Bn1 B¯n1Xn1 E = (Mn ◦ · · · ◦M1 ⊗ IE)(ρ
0
Qn1 Q¯
n
1E
) ,
where Mi, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is the TPCP map from Qni Q¯ni to Qni+1Q¯ni+1AiA¯iBiB¯iXi
defined as follows:
(i) Bi, B¯i: random bits chosen independently according to the distribution (1 − µ, µ)
(ii) Ai =


if Bi = B¯i = 0 : outcome of measurement of Qi in computational basis
if Bi = B¯i = 1 : outcome of measurement of Qi in diagonal basis
if Bi 6= B¯i : ⊥
(iii) A¯i =
{
if Bi = B¯i = 1 : outcome of measurement of Q¯i in diagonal basis
otherwise : ⊥
(iv) Xi =
{
if Bi = B¯i = 1 : Ai ⊕ A¯i
otherwise : ⊥
(v) Qni+1 and Q¯
n
i+1 are left untouched.
Note that the values Bn1 and B¯
n
1 correspond to the ones generated during the distribution
step of the protocol. The same is true for An1 , with the modification that Ai holds the
measurement outcome only if Bi = B¯i. That is, Ai 6=⊥ if and only if i ∈ S, where S is the
set determined in the sifting step. We can therefore rewrite (50) as
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω > n
(
1− 2µ−HSh(e)
)− o(n) . (51)
To prove this inequality, we use Theorem 4.4 with the replacements Ai → AiA¯i, Bi →
BiB¯i, Xi → Xi, and Ri → Qni+1Q¯ni+1. We note that Xi is a deterministic function of
22
the classical registers AiA¯i and BiB¯i. To obtain the bound in (51), we need to define a
min-tradeoff function. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and consider the state
νXiAiA¯iBiB¯iR = trQni+1Q¯ni+1(Mi ⊗ IR)(ωQni Q¯ni R) ,
where ωQni Q¯ni R is an arbitrary state. Let furthermore ν|b = νXiAiA¯iR|b be the corresponding
state obtained by conditioning on the event that Bi = B¯i = b, for b ∈ {0, 1}. We may now
bound the entropy of Ai using the entropic uncertainty relation proved in [12], which asserts
that
H(Ai|R)ν|0 > 1−H(Ai|A¯i)ν|1 .
By the definition of Xi, we also have
H(Ai|A¯i)ν|1 = H(Xi)ν|1 = HSh
(
νXi (1)
νXi (0)+νXi (1)
)
= HSh
(
νXi (1)
µ2
)
,
where we wrote νXi to denote the probability distribution on {0, 1,⊥} defined by the state ν,
and where we have used that νXi(0) + νXi(1) = µ
2. Furthermore, because Ai is classical,
its von Neumann entropy cannot be negative, which implies that
H(Ai|BiB¯iR)ν > νBiB¯i(0, 0)H(Ai|R)ν|0 = (1− µ)2H(Ai|R)ν|0 > H(Ai|R)ν|0 − 2µ+ µ2 .
Combining this with the above, we find that
H(AiA¯i|BiB¯iR)ν > H(Ai|BiB¯iR)ν > f˜(νXi)
holds for
f˜(q) =
{
1− 2µ+ µ2 −HSh
(
q(1)
µ2
)
if q(0) + q(1) = µ2
1 otherwise.
In other words, f˜ is a min-tradeoff function for Mi. Furthermore, because the binary
Shannon entropy HSh is concave, f˜ is convex. We may thus define a linearised min-tradeoff
function f as a tangent hyperplane to f˜ at the point q0 given by q0(0) = (1− e)µ2, q0(1) =
eµ2, and q0(⊥) = 1− µ2. Furthermore, we define
h = f(q0) = f˜(q0) = 1− 2µ+ µ2 −HSh(e) .
Finally, note that the event Ω that Bob’s guess of AS is correct and that the protocol is not
aborted implies that q = freq(Xn1 ) is such that
q(1)
µ2 6 e and, hence, f(freq(X
n
1 )) > h. Since
we assumed that Ω has non-negligible probability, Theorem 4.4 implies that
H
ε/4
min(A
n
1 A¯
n
1 |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω > nh− o(n) = n
(
1− 2µ+ µ2 −HSh(e)
)− o(n) .
(Note that the Markov chain conditions are satisfied because Bi and B¯i are chosen at
random independently of any other information.) Furthermore, because A¯i equals ⊥ unless
Bi = B¯i = 1, which occurs with probability µ
2, we have
H
ε
4
max(A¯
n
1 |An1Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω 6 H
ε
4
max(A¯
n
1 |Bn1 B¯n1 )ρ|Ω 6 µ2n+ o(n) .
Combining these inequalities with the chain rule for smooth entropies (see Theorem 15
of [54]),
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω > Hε/4min(An1 A¯n1 |Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω −Hε/4max(A¯n1 |An1Bn1 B¯n1E)ρ|Ω −O(1) ,
proves (51) and, hence, Claim 5.2.
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5.2 Sample application: Fully quantum random access codes
One relatively simple application of our main result is to give upper bounds on the fidelity
achieved by so-called Fully Quantum Random Access Codes (FQRAC). An FQRAC is a
method for encoding m message qubits into n < m code qubits, such that any subset of k
message qubits can be retrieved with high fidelity. Limits on the performance of random
access codes with classical messages are rather well understood: the case k = 1 was studied
in [37, 1, 2], and upper bounds on the success probability that decay exponentially in k
were derived in [9, 59, 19]. In the fully quantum case, [19] gives similar upper bounds on
the fidelity that decay exponentially in k. Here, we show that such exponential bounds for
the fully quantum case can be obtained in a relatively elementary fashion via the concept
of entropy accumulation. The example also highlights that entropy accumulation is already
useful in its basic form (3), which does not involve statistics information Xi. Indeed, here
the bound on the entropy produced at every step comes from the bound on the number of
code qubits.
Definition 5.3. A (ε,m, n, k)-Fully Quantum Random Access Code (FQRAC) consists of
an encoder EM ′m1 →Cn1 and a decoder DCn1 S→M¯SS , where M ′
m
1 represents the m message
qubits, Cn1 represents the n code qubits, S represents a classical description of a subset of
{1, . . . ,m} of size k, and M¯S represents the output of the decoder, corresponding to the k
positions of M ′m1 listed in S. Such a code must satisfy the following: for any state ρRM ′m1 S
which is classical on S, we must have that
F
(S(ρRM ′m
1
S), (D ◦ E)(ρRM ′m
1
S)
)2
> 1− ε,
where R is a reference system of arbitrary dimension, and where SM ′m1 S→M¯SS is a TPCP
map that selects the k positions of M ′m1 corresponding to those in S and outputs them
into M¯S . Moreover, F (ρ, σ) := ‖√ρ
√
σ‖1 refers to the fidelity between two states ρ and σ.
Entropy accumulation gives the following constraint on FQRACs:
Theorem 5.4. A (ε,m, n, k)-FQRAC satisfies
1− ε = f2 < 2−k(m−n−k+15m )
2
+3 . (52)
Compared to the previously derived bound (Theorem 9 of [19]), the one obtained here
is tighter for small k,16 whereas it is weaker for large k.
Proof. Since the fidelity bound must be true for any state ρ, it must in particular be true
for the state consisting of m maximally entangled pairs and a uniform distribution over
subsets S. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define
Mi :Mm−i+11 →Mm−i1 J¯iMˆi
as a TPCP map that does the following:
1. Generate an index J¯i at random from {1, . . . ,m− i+ 1}.
2. Move the contents ofMJ¯i into Mˆi, and set M
m−i
1 to the contents of M
m−i+1
1 with the
J¯ith position removed.
16The bound of Theorem 9 of [19] has a pre-factor of the order of m and is therefore only non-trivial if
k > logm.
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Finally, define the state
ρi
Mm−i1 Mˆ
i
1C
n
1 J¯
i
1
:= (Mi ◦ · · · ◦M1 ◦ E)(
∣∣Φ⊗m〉〈Φ⊗m∣∣Mm1 M ′m1 ),
where |Φ〉MiM ′i := 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉). The next step is to use Theorem 4.4 on the state ρk
with the identifications
Ai → Mˆi Bi → J¯i E → Cn1
and the tradeoff function f being the constant function equal to
inf
i,νi
H(Mˆi|Mˆ i−11 J¯ i1Cn1 )νi ,
where the infimum is taken over states νi of the form
νi
Mˆi1J¯
i
1C
n
1
=Mi
(
ωi
Mˆi−11 J¯
i−1
1 M
m−i+1
1 C
n
1
)
,
for some state ωi. Here we also used Remark 4.3, which asserts that the system R that is
used when defining the min-tradeoff function can be chosen isomorphic to Ai−11 B
i−1
1 E. Note
that the Markov chain condition is immediate from the fact that J¯i is chosen at random.
As the systems Xi are trivial, we naturally take Ω to be the certain event. We find that
H
f/2
min(Mˆ
k
1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk > k inf
i,νi
H(Mˆi|Mˆ i−11 J¯ i1Cn1 )νi −
√
4k log
8
f2
log 5 .
Furthermore, again by Remark 4.3, if part of B is classical in ρ, then it remains classical
in ν. As a result, we can assume in the following that J¯ i−11 is a classical system in ν
i.
We continue by computing the expectation over the choice of J¯i:
H(Mˆi|Mˆ i−11 J¯ i1Cn1 )νi =
1
m− i+ 1
m−i+1∑
ji=1
H(Mji |Mˆ i−11 Cn1 J¯ i−11 )ωi (53)
>
1
m
m−i+1∑
ji=1
H(Mji |M ji−11 Mˆ i−11 Cn1 J¯ i−11 )ωi (54)
=
1
m
H(Mm−i+11 |Mˆ i−11 Cn1 J¯ i−11 )ωi (55)
=
1
m
(
H(Mm−i+11 Mˆ
i−1
1 C
n
1 |J¯ i−11 )ωi −H(Mˆ i−11 Cn1 |J¯ i−11 )ωi
)
(56)
>
−n− k + 1
m
, (57)
where the last inequality holds because J¯i is classical, which implies that the first entropy in
the bracket of the penultimate expression is non-negative, and because the second entropy
in the bracket is upper bounded by n+ k − 1.
We now use Proposition 5.5 and Remark 5.6 of [50], which imply that17
H
√
1−f2
max (Mˆ
k
1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk > Hf/2min(Mˆk1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk − log
1
1− (f2/2 +√1− f2√1− f2/4)2
> H
f/2
min(Mˆ
k
1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk − log
3
f3
,
17Because arcsin(f/2) + arcsin(
√
1− f2) < arcsin(f) + arcsin(
√
1− f2) = pi/2, the condition of Re-
mark 5.6 of [50] is satisfied.
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where the second inequality holds because the denominator in the logarithm is lower bounded
by f3/3, as can be readily verified. Combining this with the above gives
H
√
1−f2
max (Mˆ
k
1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk > −k
(
n+ k − 1
m
)
−
√
4k log
8
f2
log 5− log 3
f3
.
Conversely, note that, by assumption, the purified distance between ρk and the state con-
sisting of k maximally entangled qubit pairs is upper bounded by
√
1− (1− ε) =
√
1− f2.
Since the max-entropy of k maximally entangled qubit pairs equals −k, we have
H
√
1−f2
max (Mˆ
k
1 |J¯k1Cn1 )ρk 6 −k .
We have thus derived the condition√
4k log
8
f2
log 5 > k
(
m− n− k + 1
m
)
− log 3
f3
. (58)
It is easy to verify that this condition is violated whenever
log
8
f2
> k
(
m− n− k + 1
5m
)2
(59)
is violated. In fact, if log 8f2 6 k
(
m−n−k+1
5m
)2
, then we have
4k log
8
f2
log2 5 6
4 log2 5
25
k2
(
m− n− k + 1
m
)2
, and
log
3
f3
6
3
2
log
8
f2
6
3
50
k
(
m− n− k + 1
m
)2
6
3
50
k
(
m− n− k + 1
m
)
.
Adding the square root of the first inequality and the second one, we get that inequality (58)
is violated. Thus, the condition (59) must hold, and therefore also (52).
6 Conclusions
Informally speaking, entropy accumulation is the claim that the operationally relevant en-
tropy (the smooth min- or max-entropy) of a multipartite system is well approximated by
the sum of the von Neumann entropies of its individual parts. This has ramifications in
various areas of science, ranging from quantum cryptography to thermodynamics.
As described in Section 5, current cryptographic security proofs have various fundamental
and practical limitations [45]. That these can be circumvented using entropy accumulation
has already been demonstrated in [5] for the case of device-independent cryptography. We
anticipate that the approach can be applied similarly to other cryptographic protocols. Ex-
amples include quantum key distribution protocols such as DPS and COW [26, 49], for
which full security has not yet been established.18 One may also expect to obtain signif-
icantly improved security bounds for protocols that involve high-dimensional information
18These protocols do not have the required symmetries to employ standard techniques such as de Finetti-
type theorems [41].
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carriers and, in particular, continuous-variable protocols [24, 56].19 A strengthening of cur-
rent security claims may as well be obtained for other cryptographic constructions, such as
bit-commitment and oblivious transfer protocols (see, for example, [16, 28, 19]).
Entropy accumulation can also be used in statistical mechanics, e.g., to characterise
thermalisation processes. At the beginning of Section 5 we outlined an argument that
could confirm — and make precise — the intuition that entropy production (in terms of
von Neumann entropy) is relevant for thermalisation. However, to base such arguments on
physically realistic assumptions, it may be necessary to generalise Theorem 4.4 to the case
where the Markov conditions (27) do not hold exactly. One possibility, motivated by the
main result of [22], could be to replace them by the less stringent conditions
H(Bi|Bi−11 E) ≈ H(Bi|Ai−11 Bi−11 E) .
We leave the development of such an extension of the entropy accumulation theorem for
future work.
A The function ‖ · ‖α
We use an extension of the Schatten α-norm to the regime where α > 0, which is defined
for any operator X = XB←A from a space A to a space B by
‖X‖α = tr
(
(X†X)
α
2
) 1
α .
It follows from the Singular Value Theorem that ‖X‖α = ‖X†‖α = ‖X⊺‖α = ‖X‖α (see,
e.g, Section 2 of [55]), from which it also follows that
‖X‖α = tr
(
(XX†)
α
2
) 1
α .
Note also that
‖X‖22α =
∥∥X†X∥∥
α
=
∥∥XX†∥∥
α
. (60)
The following is Lemma 12 from [36].
Lemma A.1. For any non-negative operator X and for any α ∈ R+
‖X‖α =
{
supZ tr(XZ
α′) if α′ > 0
infZ tr(XZ
α′) if α′ 6 0
(61)
where the supremum and infimum range over density operators Z.
B Properties of the sandwiched Re´nyi entropies
The sandwiched Re´nyi entropy from Definition 2.3 is a special case of the sandwiched Re´nyi
relative entropy, which is defined as follows.
19The security of continuous-variable protocols against general attacks has been proved [42], but the
bounds have an unfavourable scaling in the finite-size regime.
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Definition B.1. For two density operators ρ and σ on the same Hilbert space and for
α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) the sandwiched relative Re´nyi entropy of order α is defined as
Dα(ρ‖σ) = 1
α′
log
∥∥∥ρ 12σ−α′2 ∥∥∥2
2α
,
where α′ = α−1α .
In particular, for a bipartite density operator ρAB, the sandwiched α-Re´nyi entropy of
A conditioned on B is related to this relative entropy by
Hα(A|B)ρ = −Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ ρB) . (62)
It turns out that this is not the only way to define a conditional entropy based on a relative
entropy. One popular alternative is to replace the marginal ρB by a maximisation over
arbitrary density operators on B:
H↑α(A|B)ρ = − inf
σB
Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ σB) . (63)
We refer to [51] for a comparison of the different notions.
The following Lemma corresponds to Eq. 19 of [36]. For its proof, it is convenient to
represent vectors of product systems as matrices. Let {|i〉A} and {|j〉B} be fixed orthonormal
bases of A and B, respectively. For any vector
|ψ〉AB =
∑
i,j
γi,j |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B ∈ A⊗B
we define the linear operator
opB←A(|ψ〉) =
∑
i,j
γi,j |j〉B〈i|A .
We emphasise that this definition is basis-dependent. Therefore, in expressions that involve
this operator as well as the transpose operation Z 7→ Z⊺, it is understood that both are
taken with respect to the same basis. It is straightforward to prove the following properties
(see, e.g., Section 2.4 of [55]). For any operators XA′←A and YB′←B ,
YB′←BopB←A(|ψ〉)X⊺A′←A = opB←A
(
(XA′←A ⊗ YB′←B)|ψ〉
)
. (64)
Furthermore,
opB←A(|ψ〉)opB←A(|ψ〉)† = trA(|ψ〉〈ψ|) and opB←A(|ψ〉)†opB←A(|ψ〉) = trB(|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊺
(65)
and, hence,
‖opB←A(|ψ〉)‖2 = ‖|ψ〉‖ . (66)
Lemma B.2. For any density operators ρ and σ on the same Hilbert space and for α ∈
(0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) we have
Dα(ρ‖σ) = sup
τ
1
α′
log
∥∥∥(σ−α′2 ⊗ τ α′2 )|ψ〉∥∥∥2
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where |ψ〉〈ψ| is a purification of ρ and where the supremum ranges over all density operators
τ on the purifying system. In particular, for any pure ρABE = |ψ〉〈ψ| we have
Hα(A|B)ρ = − sup
τE
1
α′
log
∥∥∥∥(ρ−α′2B ⊗ τ α′2E )|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
2
.
Proof. Let us denote by A the Hilbert space on which ρ and σ act and by E the purifying
space, so that |ψ〉 is a vector on A ⊗ E. Then, using (60) and (65), the sandwiched Re´nyi
entropy can be written as
Dα(ρ‖σ) = 1
α′
log
∥∥∥σ−α′2 ρσ−α′2 ∥∥∥
α
=
1
α′
log
∥∥∥σ−α′2 opA←E(|ψ〉)opA←E(|ψ〉)†σ−α′2 ∥∥∥
α
=
1
α′
log
∥∥∥opA←E(|ψ〉)†σ−α′2 σ−α′2 opA←E(|ψ〉)∥∥∥
α
.
Using Lemma A.1 as well as (60) and (64) we obtain
Dα(ρ‖σ) = sup
τ
1
α′
log tr
(
opA←E(|ψ〉)†σ
−α′
2 σ
−α′
2 opA←E(|ψ〉)τα
′
)
= sup
τ
1
α′
log
∥∥∥σ−α′2 opA←E(|ψ〉)τ α′2 ∥∥∥2
2
= sup
τ
1
α′
log
∥∥∥opA←E(σ−α′2 ⊗ τ α′2 |ψ〉)∥∥∥2
2
,
where the supremum is taken over density operators τ on E. The first equality of the lemma
then follows by (66). Finally, the second equality is obtained via (62).
The next lemma concerns the conditioning on classical information.
Lemma B.3. For any density operator ρABX which is classical on X, i.e.,
ρABX =
∑
x∈X
px ρAB|x ⊗ |x〉〈x|X ,
where ρAB|x are density operators on A⊗B and {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of X, we
have
Hα(A|BX)ρ = 1
1− α log
∑
x∈X
px2
(1−α)Hα(A|B)ρ|x .
Proof. Using the explicit form of ρABX , it is straightforward to verify that(
ρ
1−α
2α
BX ρABXρ
1−α
2α
BX
)α
=
∑
x∈X
px
(
ρ
1−α
2α
B|x ρAB|xρ
1−α
2α
B|x
)α
⊗ |x〉〈x|X .
Taking the trace on both sides, the equality can be rewritten in terms of α-entropies as
2(1−α)Hα(A|BX)ρ =
∑
x∈X
px2
(1−α)Hα(A|B)ρ|x ,
which concludes the proof.
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The following lemma can be found as Lemma 3.9 in [35]; the statement and its proof are
given here for the convenience of the reader.
Lemma B.4 (Lemma 3.9 from [35], itself adapted from Proposition 6.2 of [50]). Let ρ ∈
D6(A) and σ ∈ Pos(A) with supp(ρ) ⊆ supp(σ), and define εmax :=
√
2trρ− (trρ)2. For
ε ∈ (0, εmax) and α ∈ (1, 2], we have
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) 6 Dα(ρ‖σ) +
g(ε)
α− 1 ,
where g(ε) = − log (1−√1− ε2), and Dεmax(ρ‖σ) = inf ρ˜ inf{λ : ρ˜ 6 2λσ}, with the infimum
ranging over all ρ˜ within ε of ρ in purified distance.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that σ has full support. By Lemma 6.1 in [50], we
can find a λ such that λ > Dεmax(ρ‖σ) where
ε =
√
2tr[∆]− tr[∆]2 (67)
and ∆ is the positive part of ρ−2λσ. It suffices to upper-bound λ by Dα(ρ‖σ)+g(ε)/(α−1).
Now, let {|ei〉}i∈S be an orthonormal basis consisting of eigenvectors of ρ− 2λσ. Let S+ be
the subset of S corresponding to positive eigenvalues. Define the non-negative numbers ri =
〈ei|ρ|ei〉 and si = 〈ei|σ|ei〉. Note that for i ∈ S+, we have ri − 2λsi = 〈ei|(ρ − 2λσ)|ei〉 > 0
and therefore risi 2
−λ > 1. We use this to bound
tr[∆] =
∑
i∈S+
(ri − 2λsi) 6
∑
i∈S+
ri 6
∑
i∈S+
ri
(
ri
si
2−λ
)α−1
= 2−λ(α−1)
∑
i∈S+
rαi s
1−α
i 6 2
−λ(α−1)∑
i∈S
rαi s
1−α
i .
Hence,
1
α− 1 log tr[∆] 6
1
α− 1 log
∑
i∈S
rαi s
1−α
i − λ.
Now, we solve Equation (67) for tr[∆] and bound
λ 6
1
α− 1 log
∑
i∈S
rαi s
1−α
i −
1
α− 1 log
(
1−
√
1− ε2
)
.
It remains to upper-bound 1α−1 log
∑
i∈S r
α
i s
1−α
i by Dα(ρ‖σ). To this end, we define the
TPCPmap F(X) =∑i∈S PiXPi, where Pi denotes the projector onto the subspace spanned
by ei. Note that
Dα (F(ρ)‖F(σ)) = 1
α− 1 log
∑
i∈S
rαi s
1−α
i .
The theorem then follows from the data processing inequality.
The following two lemmas relate the entropy conditioned on a classical value x to the
unconditioned entropy.
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Lemma B.5. Let ρAB be a quantum state of the form ρ =
∑
x pxρAB|x, where {px} is a
probability distribution over X . Then, for any x ∈ X and any α ∈ (1,∞),
H↑α(A|B)ρ −
α
α− 1 log
(
1
px
)
6 H↑α(A|B)ρ|x . (68)
and for α ∈ (0, 1),
H↑α(A|B)ρ −
α
α− 1 log
(
1
px
)
> H↑α(A|B)ρ|x . (69)
Proof. For any σB and α ∈ (1,∞), we have
Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ σB) = 1
α− 1 log tr
((
σ
1−α
2α
B ρABσ
1−α
2α
B
)α)
>
1
α− 1 log tr
((
σ
1−α
2α
B pxρAB|xσ
1−α
2α
B
)α)
=
1
α− 1 log p
α
x +
1
α− 1 log tr
((
σ
1−α
2α
B ρAB|xσ
1−α
2α
B
)α)
=
α
α− 1 log px +Dα(ρAB|x‖idA ⊗ σB) .
For the first inequality, we used the fact that ρAB =
∑
x′ px′ρAB|x′ > pxρAB|x, which implies
that σ
1−α
2α
B ρABσ
1−α
2α
B > σ
1−α
2α
B pxρAB|xσ
1−α
2α
B . We then used the fact that y 7→ yα is a monotone
function on [0,∞). Taking the infimum over σB and then multiplying both sides by −1, we
get the desired result. The proof is the same for α ∈ (0, 1) except that the direction of the
inequality is reversed.
Lemma B.6. Let ρAB be a quantum state of the form ρ =
∑
x pxρAB|x, where {px} is a
probability distribution over X . Then, for any x ∈ X and any α ∈ (1, 2],
H 1
α
(A|B)ρ + α
α− 1 log
(
1
px
)
> H 1
α
(A|B)ρ|x . (70)
Proof. Letting ρABX =
∑
x′ px′ρAB|x′ ⊗ |x′〉〈x′|X , we get
H 1
α
(A|B)ρ > H 1
α
(A|BX)ρ
=
α
α− 1 log tr
[(
ρ
α−1
2
BX ρABXρ
α−1
2
BX
) 1
α
]
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
x′
px′tr
[(
ρ
α−1
2
B|x′ρAB|x′ρ
α−1
2
B|x′
) 1
α
]
>
α
α− 1 log pxtr
[(
ρ
α−1
2
B|x ρAB|xρ
α−1
2
B|x
) 1
α
]
= H 1
α
(A|B)ρ|x −
α
α− 1 log
(
1
px
)
.
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Lemma B.7. Let E be a TPCP map from A ⊗ B to A ⊗ B ⊗ X defined by E(WAB) =∑
y,z(Πy,A⊗Πz,B)WAB(Πy,A⊗Πz,B)⊗ |t(y, z)〉〈t(y, z)|X , where t : Y ×Z → X is a (deter-
ministic) function, {Πy,A}y∈Y and {Πz,B}z∈Z are mutually orthogonal projectors acting on
A and B, respectively, and {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis on X. Let ρABX = E(ωAB),
for an arbitrary state ωAB. Then for α ∈ [ 12 ,∞), we have
H↑α(AX |B)ρ = H↑α(A|B)ρ , (71)
Hα(AX |B)ρ = Hα(A|B)ρ . (72)
Proof. We only prove Eq. (71). Eq. (72) is easier. Let M be the TPCP map from B to B
defined by M(WB) =
∑
z Πz,BWBΠz,B. Using the data processing inequality and the fact
that (IAX ⊗M)(ρABX) = ρABX , we have
H↑α(AX |B)ρ = − infσ Dα(ρABX‖idAX ⊗ σB) = − infσ Dα(ρABX‖idAX ⊗M(σB)) . (73)
Similarly,
H↑α(A|B)ρ = − infσ Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗M(σB)) . (74)
We now show that for any state σB , we have Dα(ρABX‖idAX ⊗M(σB)) = Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗
M(σB)). To make the notation lighter, we use in the following Πz for Πz,B and Πy for Πy,A.
The relative entropy Dα(ρABX‖idAX ⊗M(σB)) is defined in terms of
tr
(
M(σB)
1−α
2α ρABXM(σB)
1−α
2α
)α
= tr
(∑
y,z
(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α (Πy ⊗Πz)ωAB(Πy ⊗Πz)⊗ |t(y, z)〉〈t(y, z)|(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α
)α
=
∑
y,z
tr
(
(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α (Πy ⊗Πz)ωAB(Πy ⊗Πz)⊗ |t(y, z)〉〈t(y, z)|(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α
)α
=
∑
y,z
tr
(
(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α (Πy ⊗Πz)ωAB(Πy ⊗Πz)(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α
)α
,
where we used multiple times the orthogonality of the family {Πz} and of the family {Πy}.
Similarly, Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗M(σB)) is defined in terms of
tr
(
M(σB)
1−α
2α ρABM(σB)
1−α
2α
)α
=
∑
y,z
tr
(
(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α (Πy ⊗Πz)ωAB(Πy ⊗Πz)(ΠzσBΠz)
1−α
2α
)α
.
And this concludes the proof.
In the subsequent arguments we will use the quantity
D′α(ρ‖σ) =
1
α− 1 log tr(ρ
ασ1−α) .
which is defined for any non-negative operators ρ and σ on the same space and for any
α ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞). As observed in [58, 17, 23], it follows from the Araki-Lieb-Thirring
inequality [30, 3] that
Dα(ρ‖σ) 6 D′α(ρ‖σ) . (75)
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Furthermore, we can define a conditional entropy based on this quantity:
H ′α(A|B)ρ := − infσB D
′(ρAB‖idA ⊗ σB). (76)
In [51, Theorem 2], it is shown that H ′ and H are duals of each other, in the sense that
Hα(A|B)ρ = −H ′1
α
(A|C)ρ (77)
for any pure state ρABC .
The following lemma is another variant of Lemma 8 of [52] (see also Lemma 6.3 of [50]).
Lemma B.8. Let ρ be a density operator and σ a non-negative operator, let η = max(4, 2D
′
2(ρ‖σ)+
2−D
′
0(ρ‖σ) + 1), and let α ∈ (1, 1 + 1/ log η). Then
D′α(ρ‖σ) < D(ρ‖σ) + (α− 1)(log η)2 .
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 8 of [52]. The
idea is to consider, for any β > 0, the functions rβ and sβ from R
+ to R+ defined by
rβ(t) = t
β − β ln t− 1
sβ(t) = 2(cosh(β ln t)− 1) .
It can be readily verified that rβ(t) 6 sβ(t) for all t > 0, that sβ(t) = sβ(1/t), that sβ(t) is
monotonically increasing for t > 1, and that sβ(t) is concave for β < 1/2 and t > 3. It is
then shown that
D′α(ρ‖σ) 6 D(ρ‖σ) +
1
β ln 2
〈φ|rβ(X)|φ〉 ,
where β = α− 1, X = ρ⊗ σ−1T , and |φ〉 = (√ρ⊗ id)|γ〉 with |γ〉 =∑i |i〉 ⊗ |i〉.
From there, we proceed in a slightly different way, noting that
sβ(t) = sβ(max(t,
1
t
)) 6 sβ(max(t,
1
t
) + 1) 6 sβ(t+
1
t
+ 1) .
Using this as well as Lemma 11 of [52], we obtain
〈φ|rβ(X)|φ〉 6 〈φ|sβ(X)|φ〉 6 〈φ|sβ(X + 1
X
+ I)|φ〉 6 sβ(〈φ|X + 1
X
+ I|φ〉) ,
which holds because sβ is concave for β 6
1
log η 6
1
2 , and because the eigenvalues of X+
1
X +I
lie in the interval [3,∞). Using that
〈φ|X + 1
X
+ I|φ〉 = 2D′2(ρ‖σ) + 2−D′0(ρ‖σ) + 1 6 η
and combining the inequalities above, we find
D′α(ρ‖σ) 6 D(ρ‖σ) +
1
β ln 2
sβ(η) .
Applying Taylor’s theorem to an expansion around β = 0 gives
1
β ln 2
sβ(η) 6
(β ln η)2 cosh(β ln η)
β ln 2
6 β(log η)2 ln 2 cosh(β ln η) < β(log η)2 ,
where for the last inequality, we use the fact that ln 2 cosh(ln 2) < 1.
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The following lemma is a generalisation of Proposition 3.10 of [35].
Lemma B.9. For any density operator ρAB and 1 < α < 1 + 1/ log(1 + 2dA)
H(A|B)ρ − (α− 1) log2(1 + 2dA) < Hα(A|B)ρ
6 H 1
α
(A|B)ρ < H(A|B)ρ + (α − 1) log2(1 + 2dA) ,
where dA = dimA.
Proof. We start with the proof of the first inequality. Lemma B.8 implies that
H(A|B)ρ − (α− 1)(log(1 + 2dA))2 < −D′α(ρAB‖idA ⊗ ρB)
holds for all 1 < α < 1 + 1log(1+2dA) , where we have used that
1 + 2dA > 1 + 2
−D′0(ρAB‖idA⊗ρB) + 2D
′
2(ρAB‖idA⊗ρB) .
Furthermore, because of (75) we have
−D′α(ρAB‖idA ⊗ ρB) 6 −Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ ρB) = Hα(A|B)ρ .
Combining this with the above concludes the proof of the first inequality.
The second inequality follows directly from the monotonicity of the relative Re´nyi entropy
in α [8, 36].
To prove the last inequality, we again use the duality relation (76):
H 1
α
(A|B)ρ = H ′α(A|C)ρ
= inf
σ
D′α(ρAC‖idA ⊗ σC)
6 D′α(ρAC‖idA ⊗ ρC) .
We may now again use Lemma B.8 to obtain
D′α(ρAC‖idA ⊗ ρC) < −H(A|C)ρ + (α− 1)(log(1 + 2dA))2 .
Combining the two inequalities concludes the proof.
The following lemma generalises a classical result originally proposed in [43]. It follows
rather directly from similar statements proved in [52, 50, 35, 33].
Lemma B.10. For any density operator ρ, any non-negative operator σ, any α ∈ (1, 2],
and any 0 < ε < 1,
Hεmin(A|B)ρ > H↑α(A|B)ρ −
g(ε)
α− 1
Hεmax(A|B)ρ 6 H 1
α
(A|B)ρ + g(ε)
α− 1 ,
where g(ε) = − log(1 −√1− ε2) < log(2/ε2).
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Proof. For the first inequality, we use Lemma B.4, which directly implies that
Hεmin(A|B)ρ > sup
σB
(−Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ σB))− g(ε)
α− 1 .
The desired inequality then follows because
sup
σB
(−Dα(ρAB‖idA ⊗ σB)) = H↑α(A|B)ρ .
To prove the second inequality we use the duality between smooth min- and max-
entropy [53], which asserts that
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = −Hεmin(A|C)ρ
hols for any purification ρABC of ρAB. We can then employ Proposition 6.2 of [50],
20
−Hεmin(A|C)ρ 6 infσC D
′
α(ρAC‖idA ⊗ σC) +
g(ε)
α− 1 .
The claim then follows from (76):
inf
σC
D′α(ρAC‖idA ⊗ σC) = −H ′α(A|C)ρ
= H 1
α
(A|B)ρ .
C Necessity of the Markov chain conditions
The aim of this section is to illustrate that the Markov chain conditions in Theorem 4.4 are
important, in the sense that dropping them completely would render the statement invalid.
We first recall that a tri-partite density operator ρABC has the Markov state property
A ↔ B ↔ C if and only if the mutual information between A and C conditioned on B
equals zero, i.e., I(A : C|B)ρ = 0 (see [38, 25], as well as [22] for a robust version). Using
the properties of the conditional mutual information, one can easily derive the following
claims:
• Symmetry: A↔ B ↔ C implies C ↔ B ↔ A
• Local processing of endpoints: AA′ ↔ B ↔ C implies A↔ B ↔ C
• Centering of information: AA′ ↔ B ↔ C implies A↔ A′B ↔ C
• Composition: A↔ B ↔ C and A′ ↔ AB ↔ C imply AA′ ↔ B ↔ C.
By the standard properties of Markov chains described above, it is straightforward to
show that the set of Markov chain conditions (27) for a trivial E system is equivalent to the
set of conditions
Ai1 ↔ Bi1 ↔ Bni+1 (i = 1, . . . , n− 1). (78)
20Alternatively, one may again use Lemma 3.9 of [35], which asserts that the relation is also true for Dα
instead of D′α, together with (75).
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Similarly, using the composition property, one can show that this set of conditions is equiv-
alent to the set of conditions
Ai ↔ Ai−11 Bi1 ↔ Bni+1 (i = 1, . . . , n− 1).
The latter can be expressed in terms of the entropy equalities
H(Ai|Ai−11 Bi1)ρ = H(Ai|Ai−11 Bn1 )ρ .
The entropy accumulation statement for the smooth min-entropy in the simplified form (3)
can thus be rewritten as
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 )ρ >
n∑
i=1
inf
ω
H(Ai|Ai−11 Bn1 )Mi(ω) − cε
√
n . (79)
Note that, if one replaces the smooth min-entropy on the left hand side by the von Neumann
entropy then this expression looks similar to the usual chain rule for von Neumann entropies,
H(An1 |Bn1 )ρ =
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|Ai−11 Bn1 )ρ ,
which holds for arbitrary ρAn1Bn1 . One may therefore wonder whether (79) may also hold
without the Markov conditions (78). This is however not the case, as we are going to show
with a specific example.
The example is classical, in the sense that A1, . . . , An and B1, . . . Bn correspond to
random variables. In this case, (79) can be written as
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 )ρ >
∑
i
inf
ai−11 ,b
i−1
1 ,b
n
i+1
H(Ai|Bi)ρ
|a
i−1
1
b
i−1
1
bn
i+1
− cε
√
n . (80)
For the specific construction, let B1, B2, . . . , Bn be n mutually independent and uniformly
distributed n-bit strings. Furthermore let C be a uniform random bit and let A = An1 be
an n-bit-string defined by
A =
{
B1 ⊕B2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Bn if C = 0
uniform and independent if C = 1,
where ⊕ denotes the bit-wise addition modulo 2. In other words, with probability 1/2,
the string A is fully determined by B1, . . . , Bn, and with probability 1/2, A is completely
random. We then have, for ε≪ 1,
Hεmin(A
n
1 |Bn1 )ρ = Hεmin(An1 |B1 ⊕B2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Bn)ρ ≈ 1 .
Furthermore, for any i and for any fixed ai−11 , b
i−1
1 , and b
n
i+1, we have
H(Ai|Bi)ρ
|a
i−1
1
b
i−1
1
bn
i+1
>
1
2
,
for the bit Ai is random with probability 1/2. Since there are n such terms in the sum on
the right hand side of (80), it scales linearly in n. But we have just seen that the left hand
side is roughly equal to 1. This shows that this inequality, and hence also the quantum
version (79), cannot hold in general if we drop the Markov chain conditions (78).
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